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Abstract 
Historians and anthropologists oft-en see political violence as 
related to movements of social protest against established powers and 
political scientists stress the often-violent response of the state to these 
challenges. Economists working in this subject highlight the monopoly 
of coercion and force by the state and see political violence as related 
to failures of the state to maintain that monopoly. Latin America has a 
long history of political violence with domestic conflicts of different 
intensity, ideological origins, players and dynamics. In the second half 
of the XX century, political violence has included civil wars, guerrilla 
movements, military intervention, coups d’état, terrorism and others 
form of violent confrontation. The socio-economic structure of Latin 
America is characterized by large inequalities of income and wealth, 
poverty and volatile growth. 
This paper discusses the main economic and political 
determinants of conflict and terrorism as two main types of political 
violence. It also reviews recent literature on the relation between the 
process of economic development and conflict and terrorism and 
provides empirical evidence on the incidence and nature of these 
phenomena in the Latin American region in the second half of the 20  
century and early 21st century. Finally, the paper discusses how to deal 
with political violence from an institutional and developmental 
perspective, including also the prevention of and insurance against 
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I. Introduction 
An observer of human affairs today will be appalled by the 
intensity and pervasiveness of violence in various parts of the world. 
Globalization and the new technologies of information make news 
about war, terrorism and other forms of political violence in different 
corners of the world available to everyone at a rate unprecedented in 
the past. The current surge of political violence is a very disturbing 
trend. It goes against what was expected to be a steady trend towards 
progress and prosperity. In fact, economic progress and development is 
about creating and distributing wealth, rising living standards and 
improving social indicators. In contrast, political violence, conflict and 
terrorism destroy human lives and physical assets and reduce social 
welfare. Political violence is like “development in regress”. 
Historians and anthropologists often see political violence as 
related to movements of social protest against established powers and 
political scientists stress the often-violent response of the state to these 
challenges. Economists working in this subject highlight the monopoly 
of coercion and force by the state and see political violence as related 
to failures of the state to maintain that monopoly. Political violence is 
not a homogenous phenomenon and it may take various forms. Internal 
armed conflict, often between regular armies and rebel, ethnic or 
revolutionary groups are related to conflicting political agendas of 
competing groups that cannot be resolved by pacific means due to 
failures of conflict management institutions. The political determinants 
of armed conflict (internal thereof) follow a complex interplay of 
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country conditions and international conditions. The economic determinants of conflict, in turn, are 
often related to poverty, inequality and social exclusion. Another form of political violence is 
terrorism. This can be led by rebel organizations or revolutionary movements or by the state both as 
a response to “revolutionary violence” and also as a way for dominant elites to consolidate power. 
Latin America has a long history of political violence with domestic conflicts of different 
intensity, ideological origins, players and dynamics. In the second half of the XX century, political 
violence has included civil wars, guerrilla movements, military intervention, coups d’état, terrorism 
and others form of violent confrontation. The socio-economic structure of Latin America is 
characterized by large inequalities of income and wealth, poverty and volatile growth. In addition, 
the region has been affected by recurrent external shocks and distributive conflict. In the 1990s 
reforms aimed at macro stabilization, external opening, liberalization and privatizations were 
undertaken with varying degrees of success. However, it is apparent that in spite of the reforms, the 
region’s chronic problems of low and erratic growth, persistent poverty, inequality and social 
exclusion have not yet been solved. Moreover, in the last decade or so, active indigenous groups in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico have been engaged in conflict in the region following demands for 
more rights and greater autonomy. 
As conflict and terrorism produce losses of human lives and destroy assets and property there 
is a need for both prevention and insurance against this kind of risk. Conflict prevention requires 
early warnings of armed groups’ development and, more importantly it requires addressing 
conflict’s economic determinants such as poverty, inequality and social exclusion. In the case of 
terrorism, prevention includes also intelligence capabilities to detect the formation and operation of 
terrorist groups. In turn, state-led terror --often flourishing under authoritarian regimes and 
restricted democracies -- needs to be faced through a culture of respect of human rights and more 
effective democracy with effective mechanisms of transparency and accountability of police and 
security forces. 
This paper discusses the determinants of conflict and terrorism as the main types of political 
violence. It also looks at the similarities, differences and linkages between the two phenomena. The 
paper also reviews recent literature on the relation between the process of economic development 
and conflict and terrorism and provides empirical evidence on the incidence and nature of these 
phenomena in the Latin American region in the second half of the 20th century and early 21st 
century. Finally, the paper discusses how to deal with political violence from an institutional and 
developmental perspective, including also the prevention of and insurance against conflict and 
terrorism. 
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II. The determinants of conflict and 
terrorism 
Political violence, present in the history of humanity for ages, 
takes several forms: wars among countries, internal conflict, guerrilla 
warfare, military overthrow of civilian governments, terrorism, etc. 
These forms of violence often lead to serious “human destructiveness” 
in the words of Erich Fromm (1973). Thus, political violence generates 
clear welfare costs. The motivations, patterns and dynamics of conflict 
are multiple and, as we shall see in the next section, are different for 
conflict and for terrorism. Conflict involves regular armies and rebel 
groups and the scale of operations are much larger than terrorism. Yet 
conflict and terrorism may go together as the tactics of the belligerent 
sides in a conflict many times include some form or the other of 
terrorist activities such as kidnapping for political purposes, bombing, 
torture and the like. In the following subsection we will review the 
main determinants of conflict and subsequently those of terrorism. 
1. Conflict 
The motivation of internal conflict is related to grievances 
associated with a variety of factors: unequal patterns of distribution of 
wealth, lack of political rights, ideology, religion and social exclusion. 
International conditions such as influence and intervention of foreign 
powers can also affect the risk of internal conflict. The economic 
literature on the effects of inequality on economic growth stresses the  
9 
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fact that inequality generates conflict and social polarization inviting greater taxation and 
discouraging capital formation and growth.  In the case of domestic armed conflict, the degree of 
social conflict is more acute as the conflicting parties pursue their objectives by armed means. 
Conflict seems to be the result of a combination of (1) inequality that leads to polarization and (2) 
the failure of formal and informal institutions in channeling conflict through the political system. 
1
Historically, dictatorship, weak democracies and unequal societies have provided the 
background conditions for conflict to develop in Latin America.2 In fact, the agenda of rebel groups, 
from the Cuban revolution of the late 1950s, the rural guerrilla movements of the 1960s in various 
Latin American countries, the Southern Cone urban guerrillas in the early 1970s, the Central 
American rebel groups in the 1980s and others, often included the redistribution of land and wealth 
in addition to specific political demands.3 These rebel movements usually had a political base in the 
peasantry and poor urban groups4 although typically their leaders often came from the middle class 
and many were radicalized intellectuals with a university education. 
The relation between poverty, inequality, unemployment and the emergence and duration of 
armed conflict (civil wars) has been the subject of new studies done by economists and political 
scientists. Collier and Hoffler (2002) investigated 52 armed conflicts around the world between 
1960 and 1999 and identified three economic factors as having a significant effect on the 
probability (risk) of a country having a civil war: the level of GDP (the incidence of armed conflict 
in poor countries is much higher than in richer countries), the rate of growth of GDP and its 
composition (dependence on primary commodity exports)5. The level of per capita income was 
found to be a main determinant of the risk of armed conflict. Doubling per capita income reduces 
approximately by half the risk of conflict. Economic growth reduces the risk of conflict as it 
contributes to increase per capita income, thereby making society less risky to conflict. The World 
Bank, (2003) study indicates that armed conflict has developed and persisted the most 
“marginalized countries’ that is countries where the average growth rate per capita has been 
negative in the last 20 years. As “marginalized countries” often combine poor economic 
performance, a weak state, social exclusion and in many cases illegal activities, conflict tends to 
flourish. 
However, the existence of poverty, inequality and exclusion may not be sufficient for rebel 
and revolutionary groups to strive and for armed conflict to develop. Armed groups need to recruit 
people and obtain financing for their activities. The work of Collier and associates (see World 
Bank, 2003) shows that access to natural resources can be an important source of funding for rebel 
groups. This evidence may be more applicable to conflict in Africa where abundance of diamonds, 
oil and other resources has been associated with domestic strife. Also certain export crops such as 
coca and poppies are the raw material for illegal drugs over which insurgent groups can levy 
informal (or revolutionary) taxes. The cases of Colombia and Afghanistan are an example of this. 
Rebel groups also receive financial contributions from Diasporas of nationals living abroad that 
sustain the armed conflict and from supporters at home. Foreign governments may find it 
convenient to provide funding to rebel groups in other countries for their own geopolitical interests.  
The recourse to kidnapping, ransom, assaults to banks is another source of revenue for rebel groups. 
In general, the propagation of conflict and its duration depends on the capacity of the rebel groups 
to have a steady financial base supporting their struggle, the fighting capacity of the regular army, 
the support of the population and the international context. 
                                                     
1  See Sachs (1989) for the relationship between social conflict and populism in the Latin American context and Solimano (1999) for a 
review of various models of income distribution and growth.  
2  See Solimano (2005) for an analysis along these lines for the Andean countries of Latin America.  
3  See Anderson (1997).  
4  Hobsbawm (1965) provides an early analysis of disperse forms of social protest that involve some level of violence by peasants, 
bandits, sects of illiterate workers and other marginalized individuals. Barandiaran (2003) analyses the threats to property by 
“stationary bandits”.   
5  This relationship is non-linear and peaks when the ratio of commodity exports to GDP is around 30 percent. 
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2. Terrorism 
Historically, actions to produce terror among the population or in certain target groups can be 
initiated by the state or by individuals and terrorist organizations. Terrorism led by the state can be 
identified, historically, with the French revolution and the “reign of terror” of the Jacobins in late 
18  century. In the late 19  century, terrorism was associated with the actions of Russian and 
French anarchists who used terror against state authority. The existence of a dialectical relationship 
between state-led terror and anti-state terror is apparent. Once set in motion that spiral, cannot be 
easily stopped. Authors as Olson (2000) and Bates (2001) stress the rise of the state as a movement 
to secure the monopoly of force by the rulers with different effects on economic efficiency and 
prosperity. Terror by the state can then be seen as an extreme use of force by rulers to consolidate 
power and avert challenges from different groups on their monopoly of coercion. 
th th
In discussing the current rise in global political violence, George  Soros (2004) notes the 
syndrome of victims turning into perpetrators as a common feature of waves of political violence 
involving terrorist activity.6 In the 20th century there were many examples of both state led 
terrorism and anti-state terrorism. Fascism and Nazism (that capitalized on the feeling of German 
victimization following the Versailles treaty after World War I) resorted to the use of terror mainly 
against the Jews and left –wing political groups. Later on this assumed a more massive scale 
through physical extermination in concentration camps. 
After the Second World War, in the 1960s and 1970s, terrorism started to strike advanced 
economies. These were the cases of the Red Brigades in Italy, the Baader-Menhoff in Germany, the 
National Liberation of Corsica in France, the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland and 
Euzkadi ta Azkatuzana (ETA) in Spain. Nowadays, a trend towards a “globalization of terror” is 
developing in which foreign countries are the targets of terrorist groups. The most prominent 
example is Al Qaeda, the Islamic terrorist organization that has committed major terrorist acts in the 
United States (i.e September 11th, 2001) and in some European countries (i.e the Madrid bombings 
of March 11th, 2004).7 
A complex issue is how to define terrorism. A broad definition of terrorism is the undertaking 
of violent acts against non-combatants targets oriented to generate attention, paralysis or terror in an 
audience in order to attain certain political purposes.8 Recent literature has tried to explore the role 
of economic development factors such as poverty, the level of education, and unemployment in 
explaining terrorism. Krueger and Maleckova (2002) review the literature on the subject and 
perform their own statistical analysis trying to gauge the educational and occupational background 
of individuals that participate in terrorist acts. These authors focus on data available on the 
educational and occupational status of members of Hezbollah in the 1980s and early 1990s and 
found that education and poverty are statistically insignificant predictors of whether individuals 
become martyrs of Hezbollah. The authors find that the members of this group that committed 
terrorist acts, including some suicide bombers, were educated individuals with at least secondary 
education; and several of them in well-regarded occupations. Similarly, Israeli Jews who were 
involved in terrorist activities in the occupied territories in the early 1980s, were also well educated. 
A recent study on the determinants of terrorism using a large database of over 1,000 incidents 
of terrorism across 179 countries from 1968 to 2001 is Brock Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides 
(2003). This study detects several important empirical findings worth summarizing here: (i) 
terrorism is reported more frequently in high income democracies than in lower income countries 
(or “marginalized countries”); (ii) terrorism is correlated with internal conflict but the determinants 
of those two phenomena are different. In fact, there is a strong positive correlation between 
                                                     
6  Soros (2004) cites Erich Fromm (1973) for popularizing this notion.  
7  Other Islamic groups that use more localized terror against Israel are the Lebanese Hezbollah group and Hamas in Palestine. 
8  See Krueger and Maleckova (2002) and U.S. State Department. 
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terrorism and per capita income, in contrast of findings in the studies of conflict. In this line, Brock 
Blomberg et. al (2003) find that income per capita and the growth rate of GDP have negative 
correlation with conflict but a positive correlation with terrorism for the panel data set of their 
study. 
12 
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III. Empirical evidence on conflict 
and terrorism in Latin America 
conflict9 
Table 1 shows the incidence of armed conflict in Latin America 
in the period 1946-2001, classified according different degree of 
intensity, internal versus external conflict and type of rebel and 
insurgent groups.  The evidence portrayed in table 1 show that most 
internal conflicts were motivated by the interest of some of the groups 
in conflict to seize power, including the regular army through coups de 
état against elected governments. Large scale, sustained guerrilla 
warfare was observed in Cuba in the 1950s, in El Salvador in the 
1980s, in Guatemala from the 1950s until the mid 1990s and in 
Colombia since the early 1960s until now.  Wars between countries 
have been often short lived in Latin America; examples of these 
include the conflict between Honduras and Nicaragua in 1957, 
between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 and a short-lived war 
between Peru and Ecuador in 1995.  Up to the early 1990s, 
geopolitical elements common to these conflicts were the cold war, the 
influence of the Cuban revolution, the United States foreign policy 
towards Latin America and others. The economic background behind 
these conflicts were inadequate levels of per capita income, inequality, 




                                                     
9  This section partly raws on my paper “Prevention and insurance of conflict and terrorism: isues and evidence for Latin America 
(LC/L.2005-P), Serie Macroeconomía del desarrollo No. 27, 2003. 
10  See table 1 and Gleditsch, et.al., 2002 for definitions.  
11  See Solimano, 2000 and Sanchez, Solimano and Formisano, 2003. 
12  See Castañeda (1994) and Anderson (1997) for analysis of revolutionary movements and guerrilla groups in Latin America. 
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Table 1 
ARMED CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1946-2001 
Country Reason of conflict Opposition Organization Year Intensity Level *
Argentina Government Military faction 1955 Minor 
   Military faction 1963 Minor 
 
ERP (Revolutionary People's Army), Montoneros (left-wing armed 
branch of the Peronist Party) 1973-74 Minor 
  1975 Internal War 
  1976-77 Intermediate  [1]
Territory Malvinas/Falkland Islands  1982 External War 
Government Popular Revolutionary Movement 1946 Internal War 
   
MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario: National Revolutionary 
Movement) 1951 Minor 
   ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional: National Liberation Army) 1967
Chile Government Military faction 1973
Colombia Government FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas: Revolutionary  
  
Armed Forces of Colombia, ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional:
National Liberation Army), EPL (Ejército Popular de Liberación:
People’s Liberation Army), M-19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril: 19 April 
Movement), Faction of FARC, Faction of ELN,MAO (Movimiento de
Autodefensa Obrera: Workers’ Self-Defence Movement), Quintin lame 
 [2]




   1980-88 Intermediate   [4]
  1989-90 Internal War 
   1991 Intermediate 
   1992-93 Internal War 
    1994-97 Intermediate 
    1998-01 Internal War 
Costa Rica National Liberation Army 1948 Internal War 
Cuba 1953 Minor 
   1957 Minor 
   Internal War 
   National Revolutionary Council, USA 1961 Minor 
Dominican 
Rep. Government Military faction  1965 Minor  [5]
Ecuador-Peru Territory   1995 Minor 
El Salvador Government Military faction 1972 Minor 
   
ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo: People’s Revolutionary Army),
FAL (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación: Armed Liberation Forces), FARN 
(Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional: Armed Forces of National
Resistance), FMPL (Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Marti:
Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces), PRTC (Partido
Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos: Revolutionary Party 










Honduras Territory   1969  External War 
Guatemala Government Military faction  1949 Minor 
   1954 Minor 
   
MR-13 (Movimiento Revolucionario Trece de Noviembre: 13 November
Revolutionary Movement), FAR (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes: Rebel
Armed Forces), EGP (Ejército Guerrilleros de los Pobres: Guerilla Army
of the Poor), PGT (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo:Guatemalan 
Worker’s Party), ORPA (Organización del Pueblo en Armas:










   1992 Internal War 
   1993-95 Intermadiate 














Government Military faction  










Tonton Macoute, Military faction  
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Nicaragua   1957 Minor 
Mexico Government 1994 Minor 
Nicaragua Government 1978-79 Internal War 
   Contras  
Internal War 
 Military faction  1954









   
SL (Sendero Luminoso: Shining Path), Sendero Rojo (Red Path),




EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional: Zapatista National
Liberation Army 
MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria: Movement of the 
Revolutionary Left), Túpac Amaru [Guillermo Lobatón], ELN (Ejército de
la Liberación Nacional: the National Liberation Army) 
FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional: Sandinista National











1983-88 Internal War 
 1981-85






 1986-87 Intermediate 
Panama Government 
  





1988-92 Internal War 
Panama-USA Government  1989 Minor 
Paraguay Government Opposition coalition (Febreristas, Liberals and Communists)  
    1993-99 Intermediate 
Surinam Government 1986-88 Minor 
Trinidad and 
Tobago Government Jama’at al-Muslimeen (Society of Muslims)  1990 Minor 
Uruguay Government 
MLN (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional: Movement of National
Liberation) or Tupamaros  1972 Minor 
Puerto Rico Territory Puerto Rican Nationalist Party  1950 Minor 
Venezuela Government Military faction  1962 Minor 
   
Military faction (Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement for National
Salvation)  1992 Minor 
 
Source: Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand (2002). ‘Armed 
Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 39(5): 615–637. The latest vesion of this document  
http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/ 
Note: * Minor armed conflict: at least 25 battle-related deaths in that year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related  deaths during 
the course of conflict. Intermediate armed conflict: at least 25, but fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths in that year and an 
accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths. War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in that year. Names of the opposition 
organizations are given in the local language, if available, and in English. 
 Possibly war in 1976–77. 
1947
SLA (Surinamese Liberation Army)/Jungle Commando  
  
1
 Only FARC and ELN active in 1992–99. 2
3 It is unclear when the conflict changed from minor to intermediate. 
4
 Possibly war in 1965. 
 Possibly war in several of the years. 
5
6 In 1980, FMLN (Frente Farabundo Marti para la liberación nacional: Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation) was 
formed by ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo: People’s Revolutionary Army), FAL (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación: 
Armed Liberation Forces), FARN (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional: Armed Forces of National Resistance), FPL 
(Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Marti: Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces)  and PRTC (Partido 
Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos: Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers). 
7
Various groups, mainly FDN (Fuerzas Democráticas Nicaraguenses: Nicaraguan Democratic Forces). 
 In 1980, URNG (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) was formed by 
FAR (Fuerzas Armadas rebeldes: Rebel Armed Forces), EGP (Ejército Guerilleros de los Pobres: Guerilla Army of the Poor), 
PGT (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo: Guatemalan Worker’s Party) and ORPA (Organización del Pueblo en Armas: 
Organization of Armed People). 
8
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Table 2 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INDICATORS IN LATIN AMERICA 
Period Level of GDP 
per capita (1) 
Rate of growth 
of GDP 





































Source: Maddison (2003), Social panorama of LatinAmerica (2003) and Table 1. 
Notes:  1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars.  Percentage Population below the poverty line.  




As displayed in table 2 the higher number of conflicts (internal and external) in the period 
1946-2001 is found in the 1980s. There were conflicts in the relatively lower per capita income 
countries of Central America and the Caribbean (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Trinidad Tobago, Puerto Rico, Cuba). At the same time, 
conflict also affected relatively higher per capita income countries such as Argentina and 
Venezuela. Until the early 1990s the cold war was very important in shaping the nature and 
duration of armed conflicts in Central America such as the wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador in the 
1980s. When the cold war was over, those wars almost immediately stopped. In contrast, the 
Colombian conflict, fueled by illegal drugs incomes, outlived the end of the cold war. 
1. Terrorist activity 
The period under study saw the occurrence of both state-led terror and terrorist activity led by 
revolutionary organizations. The intensity and nature of terror varied across groups. During the 
right-wing military regimes of the 1970s in the Southern Cone of Latin America, state–sponsored 
terror operated through kidnappings, shootings and the disappearance of political opponents 
(included sometimes their relatives). Independent truth commissions set up after the end of those 
authoritarian regimes estimated that around 3,000 people disappeared in Chile and near 30,000 in 
Argentina during their respective military regimes of the 1970s and 1980s. Argentina also suffered 
from left-wing terrorist activity in the late 1960s and early 1970s associated with the activity of 
groups such as the Montoneros and the ERP (People’s Revolutionary Army of Argentina). 
Uruguay, over a similar period, also suffered violent actions led by the Tupamaros. In the 1980s 
Peru was besieged by terrorist activity led by Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), a Maoist group led 
by a university professor Abimail Guzman (see table 4 and 5). The intensity of violence and their 
targets varied considerably among these groups. 
1960-1970 
16 
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Table 3 
NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS BY REGION, 1991-2002* 
















































































































Total 565 363 431 322 440 296 3.4 274 395 427 355 199 4371 364.3 
Source: Patterns of Global Terrrism, U.S. Departamente of State. 
Note: *The term “international terrosism” used by the U.S. State Department is the following “means terrorism involving 
citizens or territory of more than one country.” This definition we assume includes freigners as perpetrators or victims and 
assets of fereign companies and organizations as targets of terrorist attacks. 
 
Table 4 
NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS BY COUNTRIES* LATIN 
AMERICA, 1994-2002 





































































0 0 0 







3 10 0 
Total 58 92 84 128 111 122 192 201 50 
Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism, U.S. Department of State. 
Note: *The term “international terrorism” used by the U.S. State Department is the following 
“means terrorism involving citizens or territory of more than one country”. This definition we 
assume includes foreigners as perpetrators or victims and assets of foreign companies and 
organizations as targets of terrorist attacks. 
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Table 3 shows that in 1991-2002, Latin America had the highest number of international 
terrorist attacks followed by Western Europe and Asia.  However, those attacks were highly 
concentrated in one country: Colombia, that accounts for around 88 percent of the international 
terrorist attacks committed in Latin America, followed, a distant second, by Peru (see table 4). In 
the 1990s, there were other high profile terrorist attacks in the region: the bombing in 1992 of the 
Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of the Argentina-Israeli Community Center 




POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED CASES) 
Driven by revolutionary/rebel groups State-driven Externally 
driven 
Montoneros (Argentina) late 1960s, early 1970s. 
AAA (Alianza Anti-comunista Argentina, Argentina) 
1973-74 
ERP (Revolutionary People’s Army Argentina) 1973-74 
FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) ELN 
(National Liberation Army, Colombia) 1960-until present 
National Liberation Army (Costa Rica) 1948 
FMPL (Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces, El 
Salvador) 1980-91 
URNG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, 
Guatemala) 1965-91 
Zapatista National Liberation Army (Mexico), 1994 
Contras (Nicaragua), 1978-89 
MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), Túpac 
Amaru, ELN (National Liberation Army), Perú, 1965. 
Shining Path, Red Path, MRTZ (Tupac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement), Perú, 1980-99 
Tupamaros (Uruguay) late 1960s, early 1970s. 
Argentina’s Juntas (1976-82) Bombing of 
Israeli Embassy 
1992, Argentina Brazil, under the military regime 
(1960s) 
Chilean Junta (1973-89) 
Paraguay’s Junta (1954-1989) 







Source: Table 1 and other sources. 
 
 
                                                     
13  International terrorism in that publication is defined as terrorist acts that involve nationals of more than one country and assets of 
international corporations besides national infrastructure. The data on international terrorism for Latin America and other regions of 
the world comes from the U.S.  State Department’s publication:  “Patterns of Global Terrorism”, various issues. 
18 
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IV. Dealing with political violence: 
policies for peace and 
development 
We have seen that the risk of conflict diminishes as a country 
increases its level of economic development. In fact, the countries with 
higher levels of per capita income in the world economy have a very 
low risk of internal armed conflict. This suggests that economic 
growth can be a route to reduce conflict and make societies more 
stable and peaceful. However, more rapid growth is unlikely to be the 
final solution to the complex problems of conflict and political 
violence. At the same time, growth needs to be complemented by 
social and institutional reform. We noted that inequality often breeds 
conflict, legitimizing the wealth redistribution and social reform quest 
by rebel groups. More rapid growth will need to be accompanied by 
lower inequality if we want to reduce the risk of conflict. Another 
factor that reduces the risk of conflict is effective political institutions 
and a more consolidated democracy. As mentioned before, the risk of 
internal armed conflict in consolidated democracies is very small.  In 
contrast, weak or collapsed states in impoverished countries usually 
have a high incidence of conflict. Strengthening democracy, reducing 
social exclusion, empowering the institutions of conflict management 
and ensuring sustained growth can be powerful antidotes against 
conflict. 
Various considerations are important in assessing the risk of 
internal conflict in Latin America. Although its average per capita 
 
19 
Political violence and economic development in Latin America: issues and evidence 
income level is in the middle-income range, it includes very poor countries with weak institutions 
(e.g Haiti), which are prone to conflict. At the same time its growth record in recent years has been 
inadequate and volatile and inequalities of income and wealth remain (see ECLAC, 2003). In 
addition, traditionally excluded groups such as indigenous populations in several Andean countries 
have turned into important social movements with political clout and complex demands leading to 
political crises and violence (see Solimano, 2005).  On the other hand, democracy has consolidated 
in most countries of the region; although it is still perceived by the population as fragile, see UNDP, 
2004. 
At a broader level, preventing conflict and terrorism is a complex task that involves 
economic, political and legal dimensions. A culture of negotiation and consensus can foster the 
peaceful resolution of conflict in societies. In contrast, inequality, poverty and weak institutions of 
conflict management combined with an easy access to arms and funding for rebel groups create an 
environment for conflict to flourish. Although terrorism is different from conflict, the existence of 
the latter tends to increase the incidence of the former. Colombia, for example, has a very high 
incidence of terrorist attacks and is the site of one of the most persistent conflicts in the western 
hemisphere. Tackling conflict therefore should help to deal with terrorism. In Latin America, 
groups that have used terrorist tactics in the past have had political agendas not very different from 
revolutionary movements that engaged in armed conflict. Addressing the causes of the rise of 
revolutionary groups should thus help to prevent other forms of political violence.  
A “new” phenomenon is the link between illegal drug trade and rebel activity, which 
describes the current situation in Colombia. Here, political agendas tend to be blurred by a self-
sustained conflict because of the abundance of funds available to rebel groups.  
The other issue is state-led terror, often undertaken by intelligence services and security 
forces during military regimes. These waves of state-led political violence caused national traumas 
in several Latin American countries, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. The arrival of democracy 
to the region was instrumental in reducing the incidence of state-led terrorism, as “security” groups 
were generally dismantled and the police and intelligence services were made more accountable to 
elected bodies and the press. The growing acceptance of human rights doctrine along with a freer 
flow of information also reduced the incidence of state-led terror. A topic that needs to be further 
researched is the dynamic of state-led violence that followed periods of rapid social change such as 
those lived in the early 1970s in the Southern Cone (Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile). Attempts of 
social change and income redistribution in those countries were followed by the overthrow of 
democratically elected leaders and the instauration of military regimes that recurred to widespread 
use of violence as a mechanism to consolidate their power, reverse redistributive policies, 
demobilize unions and social organizations and repress left-wing groups. 
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V. Insurance of political risk and 
social protection 
As conflict and terrorism cause economic damages and destroy 
human lives, people are willing to invest resources to minimize those 
costs. There are several instances in which the direct provision of 
public insurance is needed. For humanitarian considerations after a 
civil war or a large-scale conflict the families of victims of conflict 
often need to be compensated. This may take the form, for example, of 
for-life pensions to disabled former combatants and their families. 
After the end of the civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador schemes 
of compensations were put in place by their governments to help 
demobilized combatants and their families. In turn, in countries that 
have traditionally suffered from terrorist activity, such as Spain, South 
Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland, governments have created public 
insurance schemes against terrorism based on mandatory premiums 
and/or taxes on property.  The development of private insurance 
against damages caused by terrorist activity is a developing field. For 
private insurance of these risks to succeed it requires an adequate 
management of complex pricing problems associated with the financial 
consequences of “extreme events” in which a major terrorist attack 
(e.g. the New York City’s Twin Towers collapse on September 11, 
2001) creates very high losses that strain the financial capacity of 
private insurance and reinsurance companies and create a large 
bankruptcy risk. The problem of pricing risk of political violence may  
14
                                                     
14  The case of Great Britain is interesting. A special agency called Pool Re, basically a mutual insurance company has been set up with 
the purpose of providing reinsurance of losses on commercial property which are a result of a terrorist attack (as defined by an 
enabling statute). The British government acts a re-insurer to Pool Re, as an insurer of last resort, charging a premium to Pool Re 
only after the accumulated surplus reaches 1 billion pounds (see Jaffee and Russel, 2002). 
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be particularly serious in the gray area of terrorism and conflict, because of the lack of precise and 
well-verified knowledge of the determinants and dynamics of these phenomena. In turn, solvency 
risk can be handled, in principle, through suitable financial instruments that shift risk from 
insurance companies to investors short in risky assets. Well-structured insurance schemes have the 
property of partitioning the layers of risk with self-insurance and market insurance taking care of 
the initial layers of risk, leaving to international capital markets and public intervention to provide 
risk protection against “extreme events”. Moral hazard problems associated with too little 
mitigation and insufficient prevention is another dimension for the development of adequate 
insurance against terrorism and conflict risk. In any case, the social benefits of having adequate 
prevention and insurance mechanisms for these large contingencies are bound to be very large in 
historically conflicting Latin American societies.15 
                                                     
15  See Solimano (2003) for an analysis of these issues in the Latin American context. See also Jafee and Russel (2002), Lakdawalla and 
Zanjani (2002), Woo (2002), Kunreuther (2002), Auffret (2003). 
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VI. Final remarks 
Political violence retards economic development as it destroys 
human lives and economic assets and penalizes the accumulation of 
capital and wealth creation. In turn, the “classical” problems of 
underdevelopment -poverty, inequality, and social exclusion along 
with institutions that have failed at conflict management- breed 
political violence. Latin America has not been absent from conflict and 
terrorism in recent decades. However, the causes of its nature and 
development may differ from those of other regions of the world. Latin 
America has high inequality, persistent poverty, and erratic growth. 
Religion has played a very small role in explaining conflict. Most 
social movements, left-wing political parties and rebel groups in the 
region have been motivated by an active social agenda that includes 
income and asset redistribution as a reaction to prevailing inequality 
and exclusion. A similar agenda is shared by active indigenous 
movements in the region.  In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s several rebel 
groups in Latin America were inspired by the Cuban revolution; the 
corresponding reaction was framed in the logic of the cold war. As the 
cold war disappeared, several prominent armed conflicts such as those 
in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala ceased to exist. The 
Colombian conflict, however, proved resilient, fueled by ample 
resources linked to illegal drug trade.  Politically motivated terror has 
also been present in Latin America for decades instigated both by rebel 
groups to advance their political causes and by the states challenged by 
these groups. Latin America has had a traumatic history of state-led 
violence following the instauration of military regimes in the 1970s. 
Policies to reduce political violence call for institutional reforms, improved democracies and 
reduced poverty and inequality. Currently, in Latin America there is a clear lack of both public and 
private insurance mechanisms and social protection for facing the contingencies associated with 
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political violence, conflict and terrorism. For humanitarian reasons there is a need to structure 
public insurance and compensation schemes for victims and their families in countries that have 
suffered protracted and costly internal conflicts. At the same time, there is a potential scope for 
developing market insurance for terrorism and conflict related losses, provided there is proper 
management of incentives, risk and moral hazard issues. 
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